SECURITY ASSESSMENT MISSIONS on the national territory
FOR SECURITY ASSESSMENT MISSIONS IS AN IMPERATIVE.
The permanence of the risk of outbreak of a crisis on the national territory and its approaches, as well as the safety of our nationals abroad, necessary to consider the framework for action of the armies of more broadly to enable them to respond appropriately without leaving the role and the place which shall be their defence and security assessment . In addition, the increased vulnerability of our societies, whose citizens are more demanding in the field of security assessment , means that public authorities provide a significant and reassuring response for exceptional events which punctuate the lives of the nation. Evidenced by current reflection carried out under the aegis of Mr Jean-Claude Mallet for the Committee on defence and security assessment white paper. All players of the security assessment and defence today have a common mission: perform common security assessment expected by our fellow bubble.
As a singular player army must therefore also contribute to producing security assessment . In this area demand is most important and also being increasingly constrained State budgets, offer security assessment necessarily become a shared responsibility.
As such, the contribution of army safety, meets three major issues:
-an issue of social legitimacy: through security assessment , the army must acquire a new recognition of the company;
-a financial challenge: win the battle of budgets and consolidate the tool of defence for the production
of security assessment
-an operational issue: do not remain on the margins of the struggles of tomorrow: fighting in the city, fighting for the people, the fight against terrorism and subversion.
However, this participation of army safety presents obvious risks for themselves and the society she defends. Indeed, should guard against the risk of diverting the army to his first vocation: it must not become a "National Guard" kind of supplementary corps of the national police and national gendarmerie, or commit to over-reliance on national territory for missions who would not be the endorsed. In fine, an army entirely turned towards the production of safety would no longer participate in the external radiation from the France and produce what is designed i.e. "continue policy by other means".
Thus, the niche of intervention by the army in the security assessment field is narrow. Beforehand, should be noted that this intervention is already current. Firstly, it would be probably lawful communicating more on the subject of valuing this action of the army. Furthermore, an innovative commitment could be offered by providing capabilities that other security assessment actors do not possess. Lastly, we must reflect on the use of coercion in the national territory.
Army security assessment contribution satisfies three stakes.
The question of the use of the army on the national theatre in security assessment functions goes to three fundamental issues.
It first, for the army, to be present with his fellow citizens and enhance its image in the service of the entire Nation.
This legitimacy gained from citizens, depends on the recognition of the army as necessary for the proper functioning of our country: it is that will justify its funding. The second issue is financial.
Finally, the last issue concerns the adaptation of the army to the conflicts of today and tomorrow. This is an operational issue: is the army capable of intervening in the heart of the city to defend our safes, save our women and our children and hoist the tricolour atop tower facing an increasingly diffuse threat, for a more opaque medium. In sum, the army is able to actively participate in what Americans describe the GWOT, total war against terrorism?
111 It first is an issue of legitimacy and recognition in society: the soldier must "win the hearts of his countrymen" by participating in their protection.
Regularly, the delegation information and communication of defence (DICOD) publishes "barometer defence" synthesis of the opinions of the company to its defence tool. This indicator shows a good image of men in defence. But in fact nothing more than a "benevolent indifference" this barometer translates to the armed forces and in particular the army. If current stabilization operations, it is common to say that the army must win the "battle of the minds" : this battle deserve first and foremost to be conducted within the national territory to strengthen recognition of the army by our fellow citizens.
This raises the question of the mode of action. In national public opinion, the army still owns this image of the big battalions, cheap workforce that can be used under the urgency and without limitation related to the labour law. "That made army." It is traditionally the question arise both of our fellow citizens facing disasters caused by flooding in the département of Gard, or by the sinking of an oil tanker off the coast of Brittany.
Considering the role of the army in the field of security assessment , two modes of action are to be taken into account.
1 mode of action: participation in missions of public service and civil security assessment facing natural or technological disasters.
This is, for the army to act in the field of communal freedoms Act of 5 April 1884 together under the terms of peace and safety. Repeating the words of Alexis de Tocqueville, there is nothing that democratic peoples place above of tranquillity. If this concern is the priority of our fellow citizens and the army has the means to meet the expectations of the city, it must then engage in this way and take his account his load "quiet satisfaction."
In this area the image of the army is entirely satisfactory: Army Erika crisis management is as eloquent. Is this so rewarding for?
Indeed if army has for vocation to provide cheap labor Governments, it loses its essence: the army is before a whole system of men who must produce effects through combinations of multidisciplinary shares and which, moreover, includes the use of force.
2nd mode of action: participation in public order as the order full force.
It's in the first place on the national territory, to act on decision of political power as a force of 3rd category. This use of the army is today understood by our fellow citizens: the image of soldiers patrolling in Ile de France in public places is now familiar.
But how far can go to the use of forces of 3rd category?
Bruno Cuche, Army General of an address to the joint defense, college interns went to evoke the commitment of the army on the national territory in a counterinsurgency role.
In all cases it respond to a crisis situation. Every crisis requires a determination of the force special. In the fight against terrorism, patrols of soldiers can play a deterrent role: these "harmless" patrols in the eyes of citizens are needed; However, if an infantry company rode assault to a suburb or quadrillait field image of 10th General Massu parachutist division in Algiers, it can likely approve of the citizens.
Everything is matter of balance and proportionality: commitment to the army on the national territory is an issue of legitimacy of public opinion but that legitimacy will be acquired only if and only if the use of force is adapted to the threat. It is not certain that from today's threats army soldiers have a real capacity to graduated and proportional response.
112 It is then a financial issue: Army win the financial battle if its action is visible and recognized by those who vote its budget.
The current context is a budget reduction and restriction of expenses of the State. Efficiency and transparency of public policy research has led to the implementation of the organic law on finance laws (LOLF) whereby any State action must be evaluated in terms of cost / efficiency.
The problem arises in the army is justification of its cost with a commitment, certainly in external operations, but who does not touch the survival of the nation. Then arises the question of the profitability of the army: legitimize its funding if its action cannot be clearly evaluated: what is immediately noticeable gain for a taxpayer to finance such a tool?
The presence of the army on the national territory as a security assessment provider is an answer to this question.
113 It is finally an operational issue: army must become a veritable army of employment on national territory: the concept of terrestrial backup should enable it to expand the spectrum of its missions while allowing him to prepare for war tomorrow.
Terrestrial backup can be defined as the set of actions that can be carried out by the armed forces in a joint, interdepartmental and multinational framework in support of the policies of the State security assessment in the national territory. Nevertheless no permanent responsibility lies in this area in the army. The action of the army is reduced to a role reinforced, as part of plans and protocols or cyclical manner; It is based on the reactivity and reversibility of committed devices. In all circumstances, the responsibility of the homeland security assessment falls to civil authorities who naturally appeal to civil security assessment defences (civil protection, firefighters,...) and General Security assessment (police, gendarmerie…)
Now define a concept of terrestrial backup it is admitted that the armies, mainly army has vocation to participate in new types of missions such as counter-terrorism, supporting freedom of government action, participation in the security assessment of the territory and its approaches, especially overseas, and protection of major national events, privacy issues of vital importance whether civilian or military relief operations of populations, in exceptional circumstances, the fight against harm to the environment, national cohesion support.
This commitment is not quantitative suppletive but qualitative and active, without detracting from mean responsibilities to civil authorities and powers vested in other State services. Diversity of capacity held by the army of Earth and its ability to respond effectively and as soon as possible as well as the high degree of qualification of staff undoubtedly condemn any process of provision of means in a logic of services.
In fine, it is of standing posture of assistance within the national territory to respond to the emergency. It is a modern combat prepares Army soldier war tomorrow, characterized by the commitment in the cities, the interweaving with populations, interdepartmental cooperation and interagency.
Thus, by terrestrial backup, the army is more confined to distant shipments: it becomes an army of employment on national soil: like this she learned to better know it serves and medium it protects.
12 But this participation of army safety presents obvious risks.
121 Speaker in a domain that does not match its original mission, the army could be instrumentalized or perverted.
As the doctrine of terrestrial terrestrial backup forces employment: "when disorders or disorders are likely to create a climate of general insecurity assessment and serious damage to the satisfaction of basic administration, armies and the population needs, land forces may be required by the governmental authority, in the IM 500, as a third category (FA3) armed forces."
Military units then complement the action of forces of police and gendarmerie to enable them to concentrate their efforts in policing missions. They can act only - it will often be the case for static missions - or in mixed devices, organization is preferred for dynamic missions. They may also, exceptionally, directly involved in the maintenance of public order. In any case, ground forces will be brought to perform crowd control missions which are strictly reserved for external operations.
Within this framework, the land units are intended as a priority:
-in missions primarily to strengthen units of 1st and 2nd categories as well as police forces (loopback on the sides and behind the contact line held by CRS or EGM, actions monitoring or presence to reassure the population and to prevent hostile acts by deterrence, occupation of the land of displacement of the contact line, participation in escorts of arrested people, intelligence ground or aerial observation.)
-to protection missions, including guard important centres or premises constituting hotspots in plans for protection, childcare facilities, the guarantee of freedom of movement (clearance of obstacles, occupation of decommitted points), special escorts, joint patrols, various logistical support. »
Thus it is not within the purview of the army to ensure public security assessment in the manner of police and gendarmerie forces. Army action is complementary. To carry the policing by the army would be unnatural. History shows that the temptation has always been present on the part of the political power to use the army to this end: wine revolt in Languedoc, peacekeeping operations from order in Algeria, maintenance of General Charles de Gaulle in May 1968 with General Jacques Massu to Baden-Baden…
This temptation may be today even more tempting that army is is equipped with a doctrinal corpus in the field of control and crowd in appearance political power might consider enforcement and control of crowds are two notions otherwise similar at least very close. And indeed what is different today an infantryman equipped with knee pads, shields and helmets for a mobile guard crowd controls if the colour of its equipment?
To preserve of one such pitfall, nothing beats the testimony of an expert: "the difference between maintaining order (MO) and crowd control is not only semantic.". MO is extremely difficult. This isn't just a technique, otherwise everybody could do it, which is clearly not the case. It is a political concept: do not return the violence that it receives. It suffer to appease. The military logic, suffer, is dying. Cannot perform two modes of action. It is one either, is another. The army makes very well the high intensity; the gendarmerie is very well the policing. These are two modes of operation technical, but also psychological, which are contradictory. IDF has tried to do both and failed. The army should be guided by this example. For the military, crowd control differs from the policing by the ability of reversibility. But the gendarmerie has already undergone fire. And she has not responded so far. A Mitrovica, army countered 20 gun (...) Mounted police and the army are not the same principles for opening fire. Never the army will not integrate the political dimension in its work. It is not possible to act according to the two logical simultaneously. "However, it is quite normal that army to learn the basics of MO, but limiting to self-protection techniques".
The only dimension policy that must integrate the army, is the use of violence: military coercion must be bending the opponent to the political goals for which it is mandated. Indeed, it is not intended for, but to fight. Confine the army in this posture of crowd control could suggest our soldiers that their mission is no longer serve as weapons but to ease tensions. De facto, the army would be tempted to deny its culture of risk and commitment: it would renounce his first vocation. Crowd control is therefore only a marginal mission should not prefigure future commitments. This is also the obvious teaching of war Israel the Lebanese territory in the summer 2006: after so many years in missions of policing in their territory of IDF soldiers was so accustomed to lower the level of violence (use of force minimum) until the day where needed to oppose Hezbollah, the reaction was inappropriate: force was more subdued!
But this ethical risk just to evoke not only turned to the army. It also concerns the company itself. Enter public safety missions army national territory, is taking the risk to society of a transfer of violence in the field of security assessment . If the army was engaged in missions of national territory crowd control, should be accepting a greater threshold of violence that currently: cannot apply to soldiers the same responses than the compagnies républicaines de sécurité or mobile mounted squadrons: French society is certainly not prepared for this kind of answers.
122 Moreover, diverting the army to his first vocation, the France could relegate to second place its defence imperatives and lose sight of a key issue: hold its rank in the concert of nations.
With an army more frankly oriented security assessment missions, the France, would strengthen its security assessment but could no longer defend him;. defence is yet a vital for any company. Under pressure from elected officials and the citizens it might be tempting to move towards choices of disastrous future, as for example the commissioning of weapons reduced lethal (ALR) which, in a constrained budget context, themselves would necessarily at the expense of the weapons of war. Similarly, it might be attractive to reduce ballistic equipment to the benefit of law enforcement uniforms: some argumenteront that such equipment could be used for external operations. Indeed, the "small wars" in which the army is currently committed might suggest. He is fighting gear: small protected vehicle (PVP) would be a flagship programme in place of the armoured (VBCI) infantry combat vehicle: responsive combat in town, in the operations of law enforcement, the reduced flexibility.
Such initiatives, while economic, would take a great risk to the France and would result in the abandonment of capacity, critical capabilities to play a role as an international actor of high rank on very conflicting theatres such as the Afghanistan.
So security assessment should not go into competition with the defence. Army security assessment missions are missions coming complement. They should be translated into the implementation of specific capabilities in a field which is not specifically dedicated to him but to participate because of the added value it brings.
The niche of intervention by the army in the security assessment field is narrow.
Having regard to the risks that we mentioned above, it is clear that the army cannot receive very special missions in the field of security assessment , missions whose perimeter is necessarily limited. And first of all, one may legitimately ask whether this commitment (through both Vigipirate and Hephaestus for example) is already not to its maximum and if only actionable communication to strengthen the image of the army in this field is not just necessary? Certainly, should communicate better on the subject so the action of the army is better known, better evaluated. However, it is not enough: the army can offer tailored participation on an innovative use of ground forces in the national territory. And for this job, do not hesitate to ask the fundamental question of the use of force.
131. Admittedly, the army might simply take only a few emergency measures to enhance its readability in this area, mainly in terms of communication.
The army is an army job but in theatres of operations where she provides 80% of men engaged in the field essentially. This massive undertaking in Côte d'Ivoire, the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Lebanon in fact forget our citizens participation of soldiers from the army on French soil.
Indeed, the French have become accustom to seeing soldiers patrolling in the Parisian; stations but are they aware of the massive undertaking of units of the army for the benefit of their protection as such when Cup 2007 rugby World Cup? Recent example of the rugby World Cup is not isolated. Army, through the "proterre concept", also attended the security assessment of the G8 Summit in Evian in 2002 or the sixtieth anniversary of the Normandy landing where 12 companies, always in the format proterre, contributed to securing remembrance sites lately.
In fact, because the commitment of the army is never first curtain, this commitment is overlooked, barely visible, few gainful in terms of images. Communication ad hoc to curb this tendency arises: should demonstrate the complementarity in the field of the armed forces and the gendarmerie, the necessary distribution of roles between police, gendarmerie and soldiers from the army.
But an offensive action in the field of communication is not exclusive of any other initiative. On the contrary, it is to develop new forms of commitment by the army at the service of the French in their territory.
132 It actually propose innovative commitment in the field of security assessment by providing capabilities that other security assessment actors do not possess.
The master word of this commitment is "complementarity". The army should not replace other security assessment actors: it must act in complementarity. To be complementary, therefore to propose capabilities that others do not. What are they?
To make sorting capabilities of the army, should observe each large operational function in terms of security assessment and to evaluate which corresponds to the commitment in the national territory.
In the so-called "integral" functions, the army has first actual intelligence capabilities that can be solicited on French soil. Of course, should be to adapt the regulations authorizing such action on the national territory but moreover it seems interesting to use the capabilities of the 2nd Regiment of Hussars Sourdun for certain actions of spinning example observation. In the field of intelligence, the use of drones of the 61st RA would in order to benefit from new sources of intelligence images forces.
Always of integral functions, the army can provide important logistical means: during major events, sometimes impromptu as in the case of "rave party", it would seem reasonable to extend urgently, the forces of order of responsive and reactive support .
At this stage of reflection, we observe that the capabilities of the army, in the mentioned cases are never diverted from their original vocation: there is thus a dual interest in this capacity offers: firstly the forces of order are supported in their mission by new effects multiplier energy; on the other hand, the army participates in fellow security assessment by implementing the know-how related to its core business.
For so-called functions of engagement, we apply the same reasoning, at least for surface-to-air defence and the arrangement of terrestrial space (engineering). Indeed, in security assessment missions, it may be beneficial to implement radars of defence soil air to monitor one spot, a nuclear power plant or an urban centre for example. The action of engineering will also recommended for all missions related to preparedness (infrastructure, strengthening expertise Nedex), mobility (clearance of obstacles for example) support. So many capabilities that police forces do not possess.
However, a problem for recent engagement operational functions: dismounted combat (infantry) and armoured combat (armour cavalry). These functions, except the use of force, can hardly deliver additional capacity to the forces of order traditional. This leads us to the fundamental question: are we ready to use the army on the national territory with a mission that would attract the strength of our soldiers? In short, far can go to the commitment of the army on national soil, in security assessment , in the use of force?
133 Without Shun its original vocation, employment of army national theatre could go up to the employment shares of coercive force.
Army basic capacity is its ability to control the environment: it occupies field, over time, permanently offering a wide range of responses from the mere presence at the opening of the fire. But the Middle control requires the presence of force: it is in itself a demonstration of force.
It comes to "demonstrate the presence of the force in the population", which also helps to ensure public order. Control of the environment aims to "deter the opponent by depriving him of his freedom of action to prevent the emergence of new threats", to "search the adversary and neutralize" and to "refresh the information on the human environment and appreciate the level of acceptance by the people ."
It is for the land forces to be present on French territory by ensuring visibility; but not only, it is also to go beyond population (patrols, observation).
Furthermore, land forces can resume their mission of hunting: search for criminals, stalking, search for indices…
Finally, the army can control axes, an area, escorting convoys and if authorizing the opening of fire as it was when the plan STATER (escort euros for its putting into circulation in the European Union on 1 January 2002).
Thus, any deployment of soldiers in army assumes the use of force. It is therefore that the army is whatsoever a corps of back-up troops. It instead an apart forces that political power must use a particular threat. The capabilities it delivers are complementary. Forget that employ army national ground is to allow, where appropriate, the use of violence, would be a serious offense against the spirit!
2nd part:
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LAND CAN NOW OPTIMIZE ITS INTERVENTION IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY ASSESSMENT
IN SEVERAL WAYS.
"Reference to published defense white paper in 1994, doctrine gives a place casting great strategic function of projection, inseparable from the action."
However, the armed forces cannot be reduced to a screening tool available from international organizations. Armed forces are employed permanently, in time of peace, for missions of deterrence, protection and prevention. »
Doctrine of employment of forces in operation.
PIA-00. 200
If the niche of intervention by the army in the security assessment field is narrow, such participation should however be optimized: this is a question of performance.
The commitment of the army in security assessment missions can first be valued through its permanent action in the field of civil security assessment : but the army should further increase its visibility and renovate its employment.
In addition, it must develop a real capacity in the field of security assessment through the realization of special effects. This innovative implementation of dual-use capabilities must be accompanied by a real academic renewal to be efficient.
Finally, it should be to increase the responsibility of the army in the field of security assessment through terrestrial backup, mission of the army of the future and which calls new definitions in particular in the field of the fight against terrorism.
21 - Intervention by the army in the field of safety must first be valued through so-called missions of "defence and civil security assessment ".
The army is a major player in the security assessment thanks to his intervention in the field of protection and civil security assessment . But this participation is still too little known.
211 - The army is a forefront player competing French civil protection.
Since 1733, the France has never called into question the principle of free relief. He returned to the State to protect the city against any form of abuse and risks. This protection concerns as well people as assets and the environment. "Protect" is therefore an essential function of the State. Many actors are involved in this function. 2004 Civil safety Modernization Act recalled the responsibilities of each party and in particular the joint responsibility of the ministries of Interior and defence.
There are two types of actors in the field of civil protection. First actors so-called "permanent": it is 250 000 civilian fire (fire different departmental fire and rescue services) and military (brigade of firefighters from Paris) and Marseille sailors-fire brigade and 1500 engineers of military formations of civil security assessment (ForMiSC). Then the players expressed "concurring" whose original mission is not relief but exceptionally involved in this type of missions: it's armed forces, the national gendarmerie, national police and other State services.
Instruction and intervention of civil security assessment (UIISC) units in this area a role essential but unsung. They are born in 1968. UIISC n ° 1 of Nogent-le-Rotrou was born from an autonomous detachment of the brigade of firefighters from Paris (PPSO) specializing in technological risks. UIISC n ° 7 of Brignoles is born from a squadron of conscientious objectors vested in protection and forest fire fighting missions.
These units are today's three:
-the UIISC n ° 1 of Nogent-le-Rotrou consisting of 4 companies of intervention (i.e. approximately 600 men) is specialized in rescue-clearing and risk CBRN;
-the UIISC n ° 5 de Corte composed of some 50 men; This unit weapon command post to fight the fires in Corsica and hosts summer 600 men in provenance of UIISC n ° 1 and n ° 7.
-the UIISC n ° 7 of Brignoles consisting of 4 companies of intervention (i.e. approximately 600 men) is specialized in the fight against forest fires.
The UIISC belong to the army, engineering weapon and are available for employment at the Ministry of the Interior. The ComForMiSC must be able to deploy permanently 7 sections of intervention (established in three hours - initial autonomy of 12 days): it is its operational contract. In addition, it deploys each summer 650 men in Corsica. In addition the UIISC participate in any type of emergency France and overseas mission as example of the tsunami in Asia in 2005.
The participation of the army in the mission of the State through its three UIISC is essential. It allows the State to have a quality emergency force because she is armed by the military status requires discipline and availability without financial compensation. However, it may regret that this commitment to the army in such missions lack of readability. Moreover, even if since January 31, 2007, the UIISC bear the name of regiments and their flags from the hands of the CLS received on place d'armes of the school of engineering, this commitment is still too little recognized in the eyes of public opinion and also in the Defense community.
The army, as exclusive player in respect of civil security assessment , military formations and as an actor concurring with the units that lend strong hand crisis is therefore an important player in civil security assessment . However, this participation can be further improved.
212 Should yet optimize army field action while providing expanded in any major crisis response capacity.
The army has equipment, men, means and command structures; It is also used to act in an emergency, often in degraded mode. It therefore has a leading role to play in the management of crisis even though it is not its original mission.
The army is able to propose a very wide range of specific know-how field efficacy will be obtained only by implementing action modes controlled by alone. This is why it should be "proactive" in both phases of planning, operational readiness in the development of actions to drive. Should be to rely on the joint territorial defence organisation (OTIAD), major player, guarantor of quality civil-military cooperation. This joint chain task oriented, holds a decisive place in order to educate, inform and, especially, to advise the corresponding civil authorities. Action of the General area of defence officers (OGZD) senior commanders overseas (COMSUP), departmental military delegates (DMD) is essential to understand and recognize the role of hosts, and in particular of the army, the national territory.
However some measures seem necessary to increase the performance of the army in relief to populations in the national territory.
first proposal: provide the army command structures of crisis management.Ø
All management of crisis within the national territory requires large capacity of coordination in the field. In times of crisis, a dedicated operation (crisis CO) Center is implementing departmental level of Prefecture départementale under orders from the prefect of Department, at zonal level, at the level of CO of zone (COZ) under orders from the prefect of zone, nationally assisted by the prefect responsible for security assessment and defence. These structures are effective and it is not uncommon that a military authority, often through the figure of the départemental military delegate, participates in this crisis management. However, on the ground, it is often difficult for these CO of crisis coordination means : these CO in particular means of command and are struggling to establish a permanent liaison with all stakeholders.
The army is able to compensate for this deficiency. Indeed the regiments of the army, spread throughout the national territory, are able to deploy in the urgency of the means of transmissions with an effective mesh implant a battle over a particular area command post implement means of data transmission (stations "Carthage" present in all the regiments).
second proposal: merge Center area operations (COZ) and the joint staffs of Defense zone (EMIAZD).Ø
In a context where any crisis management is interdepartmental, it seems appropriate to streamline decision-making centres. It seems more efficient today to gather all actors of crisis management in a location subject to the same count as opposed to disperse energy. Some will object that military means in crisis, although as employed by the administrative authority i.e. the prefect, are still under military command (OPCOM to the ECS, officer zone defence (OGZD), TACOM OPCON or tactical Commander Parr). However, this argument does not appear sufficient reason to duplicate command structures: EMIAZD and COZ certainly fall under different authorities but have a common goal. These two organizations could merge always placed under the authority of the prefect and by requiring the participation of the army through the OGZD.
third proposition: give a permanent OPCON OGZD pour L'ensemble de troops stationed on the area of defence in crisis management.Ø
Crisis, the State services are more or less quick. The army, and more generally armies have certainly a chain of efficient command through the establishment of joint territorial defence organization (OTIAD). However, the OGZD commitment decisions still lack expeditiously because of requests to the ECSS via the centre of planning and conduct of the operation (CPCO). Response, including the army, time could be shortened if the OGZD possessed a permanent OPCON on troops stationed in their area (within the limits of a certain size should be set).
fourth proposal: define a budget heading reserved for interdepartmental crisis management.Ø
Army intervenes on the territory by two mechanisms: the requisition and the application for aid. In both cases, the intervention cost remains, most of the time, supported by armies. In a constrained budget context, the absence of a priori defined budget line for crisis management appears to be a recurring problem. Certainly crises are unpredictable, as commitments in external operations and yet, for the latter, in mission "defence" defined by the organic law on the laws of Finance (LOLF), there a particular credit to EUR 250 million for commitments of the army. A similar approach to the undertakings on its territory would be army more flexibility and more initiative in favour of the French.
fifth proposal: create an alert type Cheetah reserved at the national theater (Cheetah TN) system.Ø
In some plans (Vigipirate and Hephaestus for example), army enjoys troops in warning that in case of difficulties can be quickly planned to strengthen an existing deployment of troops. This alarm device is exclusive and there are no warning system standing facing the unexpected, unpredictable crisis on the TN. Then it would seem reasonable to define a volume of troop alerts to the national territory. This would be to sort the France of a "BG 1500 TN" that is exclusively turned towards emergency on the national territory. The army lives already at the rate of alerts and availability: is the said device "Cheetah" comprising modules varied and adapted to the expected effects. National territory, the effects expected by the army in the event of crises are multiple: protection, restoration of mobility, command, support logistique… support After having identified all of the expected effects, it would be to define modules of alerts in the style of what is done for the Cheetah OPEX device.
The intervention of the army for civil security assessment missions can therefore be optimized. Nevertheless, it is not the original vocation of the soldiers in the army; their own mission is to serve as weapons. Therefore it is now considering how the army could optimize its use on French territory in its usual tasks. In short, what capabilities the army is able to issue to the General security assessment service?
22 - The army must deliver capabilities and formalise her job in a clearer manner.
The army consists not only of infantry and tanks; It is multidisciplinary, it therefore has a number of dual-use, capacity i.e. capabilities that both can be used in traditional commitments and benefit of the domestic missions. The army must then speculate on the effects that it can produce and how it should conduct its commitments on French soil finally what should lead towards a key doctrinal revival.
221 By setting the catalogue of dual-use capabilities.
For observer non-notified, army are primarily men, tanks and guns. This vision is simplistic and does not consider the use of the army in a way relevant on French soil. Army, it is before a whole range of capabilities. But many of these capabilities are directly importable on French territory.
sixth proposal: leverage the army using its dual capacities within the national territory and thus transforming the army into veritable "army of employment" in the service of his fellow citizens.Ø
What are these capabilities? They are many and varied; can be classified into three categories:
i the immediately transferable skills in civilian life:
It's military capabilities which are held by other actors such as services of the State and private companies.
These capabilities include first logistics domain. The army has true capabilities of transport thanks to its trailers super weight heavy but also because of its maritime transhipment capacity (train, parked in La Rochelle 515ème Regiment).
The army also possesses works capabilities: road work of course but also railway works through the 10th company work of tracks of the 5th Regiment engineer stationed at Versailles.
II - military capabilities that could be put at the service of security assessment without changing the original nature.
It's military capabilities, without changing nature, might find their usefulness for safety.
It is for example observation capabilities: intelligence picture by drones or gazelles Viviane; human intelligence through teams of specialized research of 2nd type Hussars or 13th régiment de dragons parachutists.
It is also of protection capacity: realization of backup engineer combat radar coverage (radars surface-to-air integrated ROLAND weapon system) on the outskirts of hotspots.
It's finally command capability: realization of relay transmission, development of tactical command post supply of means of transmission (HF data transmission means) and operators (for example graphic).
III - military capabilities whose employment is deviated from the original mission.
It's essentially combat capabilities that can be used within a crisis but using their skills outside of the expected initially as a degraded in Summary mode. If an infantry battalion is used to help the earthquake victims in a flood, there is a tool to fight for a task which is not his own.
Still is the case when engineering units implement means of tactical crossing in an environment with no tactical or armoured units equipped with tanks of troubleshooting which could be used to identify an axis obstructed by heavyweights including drivers would be on strike.
There is thus a panel means dual who find use of security assessment forces to contribute to restoring public order on the national territory. However, this vision is reductive to army because it relegate this institution as a purveyor of means. What matters is to consider the army as a system that combines men and various ways to produce a specific effect.
222 In valuing the army's commitment to produce specific effects.
The army must fit among providers of security assessment as an actor full i.e. as producers of special effects. Use of the army in the field of security assessment must be optimized by displaying a singular ability to other actors. It is in this that the participation of army safety is not competing the national gendarmerie, customs, police, firefighters, social services but rather complementary.
seventh proposal: use army national territory asking him to produce effects and does not provide the means.Ø
The complementarity of the army should speak from capabilities that others did not, i.e. "capability niches." Basically, it comes to emulate the effect based approach operations (EBAO) own external operations domain broader homeland security assessment .
In any crisis management, administrative authorities will pass command to the army in new terms. For example, for urban riots, it may request Army ground rather than "overview in three portions of two gazelles Viviane over such zone" but rather "information on the movements of the rioters on such zone between am and pm +... with effort on such portion of terrain… '. ». He then returned to the army to implement its own means with different sensors, various analysts, different command capabilities. In this way, army will remain employed in its own framework and employment will not denatured.
eighth proposal: reserve the use of the army in the field of security assessment specific skills.Ø
Army will become a powerful player in the field of Homeland Security assessment and public order within the national territory when offer what is lacking in others.
In the collective consciences of many elected officials, including army remains a big battalion reservoir that is a pool of cheap labor. This was true until the suspension of the national service. Since the 1990s, the army has lost more than 40% of its regiments, units are reordered from their core business. Finally the soldier of today is no longer the conscript in the past, Beck and "free" for which his time spent under the flags was a period of civic education. If once it seemed natural that conscripts attend for example cleaning the beaches of Brittany after the sinking of the Amoco Cadiz in 1978, the repetition of such operations by the committed volunteers today is rather poorly perceived.
Therefore today to promote the use of the soldiers on French soil through missions that affect their core business. The professional soldier represents a cost to society: use a professional soldier as a cheap workforce would be an unfortunate mess for the taxpayer. The soldier must therefore be used to produce force. But it is necessary to do this, modify the doctrinal corpus to "allow" this job "military force" in security assessment missions.
223 Developing a base of training and specific security assessment missions doctrine.
The army is lurking outside; commitment It particularly army standing in the context of the crisis on territories where the State is bankrupt and where the legal rule is more updated.
National territory, is any other, but he is unclear men forming the army are actually trained at this engagement framework.
ninth proposal: better adapt training, coaching, staff particularly domestic missions.Ø
Beyond of the principle of self-defence, known by all, it turns the rules of engagement in the national territory remains poorly known by those who have to drive an action of prevention, or even coercion on the national territory.
Thus, it would be advisable to integrate into the corpus of training schools for initial training (National School of the NCO active in Saint-Maixent and Coëtquidan officer training schools) a specific course of criminal law.
But this is not enough, wouldn't it inadvisable to train officers of the army as an officer of judicial police or while in the second part of career directing some NCO to this specific but profitable training detachments involved on the ground.
This specific training in particular could be carried out by officers of the national gendarmerie (EOGN) school in a partnership where each actor would be winning because she would participate in mutual knowledge and interoperability of security assessment and defence players.
Pathways to optimize the use of the army on the national territory are many and are based on very specific provisions. However, the heart of the matter is to know how to use the army by the operator in its core business, i.e. the use of force.
This will pass through the definition of a concept of terrestrial backup renewed reflecting a more proactive attitude of the army.
23 - Finally, should increase the accountability of the army in the field of security assessment through terrestrial backup, mission of the army of tomorrow.
"Posture terrestrial backup organizes contribution of armies to actions, often in a continuum metropolitan territory, overseas, foreign (...)" Ground armies action fits into interdepartmental safety device (...) "Terrestrial backup isn't is exclusive to army, thereof, having regard to its skills is best placed to act on the ground on a wide range of know-how.
If the Earth's backup is well posture, it comes to defining the participation of the army in this particular posture that implies fulltime as a player.
231 Terrestrial backup should grant greater independence to units of the army on the national territory.
The army missions Vigipirate participation has been renovated. Indeed, the soldiers of the army since 2002 patrol alone in public places or participate in static guards in the complementarity of the police or the gendarmerie device but without proximity police force. Therefore, greater independence was granted to the army in such missions. However, it is probably possible to go even further in order to access more advanced terrestrial backup concept.
tenth proposal: strengthen protection and enforcement missions carried out by the army on French soil.Ø
It's daring use of army. Indeed, the use of force by the State must include all the means and the use of powerful and deterrence means must be used, when the army which can legitimately intervene.
It is already the case in Guyana where the Army operates in two specific types of actions:
- the protection of the Guyana space centre (CSG). This protection is a sensitive mission which involves a range of varied ways: radar, surveillance patrols in vehicle high mobility (VHM), cynotechnie, posture of safety of very short-range (VLLAD-Mistral) surface-to-air missiles.
- The fight against the Stampeders. This mission includes a character of particular danger: it is therefore natural that the Army broken engagement of arms and trained to risk-taking, participates as it unfolds in a hostile natural environment that requires men experienced in this environment.
The natural question that arises concerns the extension of such missions on Metro tillage. It seems appropriate to engage the army on the national territory for missions who today out of its usual framework, but that tomorrow could become his prerogative: patrol in sensitive urban areas, surveillance radar and privacy sensitive sites (nuclear power plants, recherches… facilities) surface-to-air
However, the commitment of the army in this type of mission shall be accompanied by two types of measures:
- legislation authorizing the use of the intelligence capabilities of the armed forces on French soil on the one hand and on the other hand simplifying the use of forces of third category;
-rebalancing in favour of certain operational functions such as engineering, defence NBC, intelligence.
Moreover, at the time where the army is redefining its territorial mesh on the ground French in the sense of a greater rationalisation, it appears necessary to not to underestimate an essential: need this new territorial organization takes into account the development of terrestrial backup while redeveloping the notion of Commander of weapons.
eleventh proposal: reinvigorate function of Commander of weapons and develop "spirit of garrison".Ø
At the time where the risk within the national territory is more pithy, it seems inappropriate to abandon territories and create military deserts. New army mesh should abandon no more town 150 000 inhabitants. Thus, each major French city had both of his commander of weapons, the function could match the departmental military delegate today, and a unit which would create a sense of proximity to the army with the nation. The territorial army device currently disparate: If the current project is to gather units around large attractive employment basins, this should translate into a more marked anchor regiments around French cities.
What added value then a city having a regiment in its walls: each regiment is a player in security assessment at the local level. Without diverting the regiments of their first missions, their presence in large French cities would confer despite a surplus security assessment for these cities.
232 The army device must fit over voluntarily in the zonal device.
The area of defence is today a recognized and compelling synthesis level. The prefect delegated security assessment is indeed a key contributor to the device.
In addition, we have seen above that terrestrial backup, in the manner of maritime saving secured by the maritime prefect became a permanent army posture.
We finally found that the army, its volume, its resources, its experience, is a key contributor of this terrestrial backup but employment still lack efficiency especially due to a chain of command complex and finally little suited to events occurring within the national territory.
Accommodation would be to confuse administrative authority and military authority.
twelfth proposal: merge functions OGZD and prefect responsible for security assessment in the areas of defence.Ø
The manner of maritime prefectures where the maritime prefect have full authority on the Sea State action, it seems appropriate to reflect on what could lead General officers nor as OGZD but prefect delegated security assessment action.
Beyond of the merger of the COZ and EMIAZD already mentioned above, this would match all terrestrial backup powers in the hands of a single official: military authority vested with administrative privileges.
The proposal seems interesting to more than one way. It first to leverage the concept of terrestrial backup since this concept would not be in the hands of a single player. You can then simplify the use of the armies on French soil terminating this dichotomy between military authority and administrative authority. Finally, it offers hosts a choice position since it placed at the heart of the nation, safety device place which is finally more than legitimate since it is from one of their essential missions.
233. Finally, the army has a role to play in the fight against terrorism.
Phenomenon knowing no boundaries, terrorism requires to fight, States reactivity and an ability to cooperate with each other. The army has unique strengths in this area.
2331. The example of the United States, committed since 11 September 2001 in the GWOT is eloquent.
The creation of the Northern Command in April 2002 and Department of Homeland Security assessment in June 2002 symbolize awareness of the need, in the current context, federal Homeland Security assessment and defence policy.
It is difficult to compare the Department of Homeland Security assessment with the French Ministry of the Interior. The prerogatives and missions of the Ministry of the Interior transcend stricto sensu of security assessment and includes many other areas like some aspects of policy of decentralisation, management of local and regional authorities, cults. It is also difficult to translate literally the American expression "department of homeland security assessment " and to find a French or European equivalent. In American design, national security assessment means beyond the borders of the country and takes into account the factors of different origins. For example, air safety, the flow control will be from the point of departure of the aircraft abroad.
Its missions are extensive:
- intelligence and alert early or strategic intelligence (in France, the use of means of the DRM is prohibited within the national territory).
- border and transportation security assessment (France this area is part of the Ministry of the Interior with the police of air borders, the Ministry of economy and finance with the Customs and the Ministry of transport service).
- combating anti terrorist at the national level.
- protection of heritage and susceptible infrastructure.
-defending against catastrophic threats with emphasis on research and development.
U.S. ground forces were very quickly and very much engaged in the GWOT. A role was first assigned to guard; it of course its own mission. But beyond the strengthening of commitment to the Army National Guard was put to contribution: 6000 men of the Army were deployed for monitoring 422 U.S. airports. The South with the Mexico border surveillance has been strengthened by a permanent arrangement (surveillance radar, patrols, rapid response capability): it is therefore a genuine control operation zone that has been implemented and dedicated to the monitoring of borders.
For the Army, the aftermath of September 11 are translated by a redefinition of its tasks. His involvement in homeland security assessment now extends to the following areas:
- participation in relief in the event of disasters;
- strengthening of the public force to enforce the law;
- managing physical and psychological consequences of an attack;
- and more importantly, strategic infrastructure protection.
2332 How French army can in turn participate in the fight against terrorism?
Firstly, it should be recalled that the fight against terrorism is global and that the army already pay a heavy invoice. She was hired permanently in NATO in Afghanistan around Kabul, regional command a battalion deployment assistance missions of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Operationnal Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLTS).
However, the army can contribute to this struggle by other forms or even European national territory.
thirteenth proposal: army could participate in security assessment at the borders of Europe.Ø
At the time where the boundaries of the France safety is entrusted to our neighbours in the Schengen area, it seems appropriate to envisage the participation of the army's security assessment of the Schengen area.
The army is an army of projection, it participates in any sort of missions in the Balkans, Ivory Coast, Afghanistan, the Lebanon. It might also participate in the security assessment of the European territory by performing missions of protection and surveillance to the markets of Europe, in the manner, in a certain way, what did the U.S. Army on its border with the Mexico.
For example, it would not futile to participate in the security assessment of the frontiers of Europe through the current missions in the Balkans. Many criminal trafficking currently pass through this area of non-droits at the gateway to the European Union: narcotics, weapons, prostitution. European soldiers of KFOR deployed in Kosovo or EUFOR deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina would find a justification very specific of their projection on these territories if their actions truly embodied by a diligent fight against trafficking.
14th proposal: daring to use without taboos of the army national ground intelligence capabilities.Ø
When threats are more diffuse and where the risk of assault on the national territory and outside of the territory blend, it seems most conducive to mark this differentiation between domestic intelligence and foreign intelligence.
It seems more than is necessary to involve the means of the Directorate of military intelligence (DRM) at the service of the national homeland security assessment . Thus, he may finally be possible to commit certain types of sensors for specific missions on French soil: patrol Regiment drone intelligence, Hussar of the NCO of listening of the 44th Regiment of transmission to the depth of parachutists commando action.
Similarly, information collected by particular service, military or civilian, can circulate more efficiently to serve the State security assessment . Note also that it fits perfectly measured rationalization of stream current intelligence to the Ministry of the Interior through the consolidation of the direction de la surveillance of the territory (DST) and background (RG).
fifteenth proposal: prepare the army for the counter-insurgency.Ø
In fine, should guide the entire army to this new mode of action that everyone, from the end of the war of Algeria had forgotten but that all replicated since the commitment of the U.S. Army in Iraq: the counterinsurgency.
This type of combat probably foreshadows what will be tomorrow war: fight against an uncertain actor on distant territories and simultaneously a homeland defense more more threatened by these same players who will be more contained a distant territory.
Lessons from the war of Algeria, today considered very careful way by our U.S. allies, synthesize control operations against issue guerrillas of the FLN by three words: protect, educate, respond.
Protection through control of theatre and its strict delimitation. Facing the fluidity of the adversary, to its faculty to fades in a framework adapted to FIW and frustrating direct confrontations, intelligence is the safest way, otherwise the one allowing to effectively organize actions in order to hang it and putting out of State to harm, without losing efficiency by dispersion of efforts. Retaliation is possible through the exercise of permanent pressure creating a climate of insecurity assessment for the rebel groups and refusing any freedom of action, vital for a guerrilla war.
Rediscovering certainly controversial but visionary players such as Roger Trinquier or David Galula, the army must prepare for this type of commitment which will not save the national territory. This uses core qualities such as the knowledge of the environment, capacity reversibility, the spirit of synthesis, moral force. The tomorrow war prepares today.
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